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In Europe, as elsewhere in the industrialized world, the question of how motorists
respond to oil prices is a priority concern of environmental policy. Private automobi-
les not only account for 12% of the European Union’s CO2 emissions (EC 2007), but
are also responsible for a range of other negative externalities, including noise polluti-
on, congestion, and accidents. For several decades, European governments have relied
heavily on fuel taxation both for raising revenues and as a disincentive to drive, with
fuel taxes accounting for upwards of 75% of the price that Europeans pay at the pump.
More recently, the European Commission (EC) has turned its attention to efﬁciency
standards to lessen the environmental impact of cars, and is currently considering a
legislative framework that would reduce average emissions to 120g CO2/km by 2012.
A critical question in gauging the merits of such policy measures concerns how
consumers adjust to the unit costs of energy services such as car travel. While higher
fuel prices, as implied by soaring oil prices or increased taxes, raise these costs, impro-
ved efﬁciency effectively reduces them, thereby stimulating the demand for car travel.
This demand increase is referred to as the rebound effect, as it offsets the original re-
duction in energy demand that results from an increase in efﬁciency. Though the basic
mechanism underlying the rebound effect is widely accepted, its magnitude remains a
contentious question.
A survey by GOODWIN,D ARGAY, and HANLY (2004), for example, cites fuel-
price elasticities - from which rebound effects can be derived - varying between 4%
and 89% based on both short- and long-run estimates from studies using pooled cross-
section/time series data. More recent work by WEST (2004) and FRONDEL,P ETERS,
and VANCE (2008), who use household-level pooled and panel data from the U.S. and
Germany, puts the estimated rebound effect at the high end of this range, averaging
between 87% and 57%, respectively. At the other end, SMALL and VAN DENDER (2007)
uncover rebound effects varying between 2.2% and 15.3%, using a pooled cross-section
of U. S. states for 1966-2001.
4Todate,theempiricalliteratureonvehicleusehasidentiﬁedthereboundeffectal-
most exclusively via fuel-price elasticities, thereby relying on the assumption that both
rebound and price effects are simply two sides of the same coin: behavioral changes
due to varied unit costs of energy services such as car traveling. Furthermore, the ma-
jority of empirical attempts to estimate price and, hence, rebound effects have drawn
on country-level data or data aggregated at sub-national administrative districts, with
a smaller pool of studies relying on household data.
The present study seeks to advance this line of inquiry by estimating econometric
models of car use on a panel of travel-diary data collected in Germany between 1997
and 2006. The study completes a recent analysis of elasticity estimates by FRONDEL,
PETERS, and VANCE (2008) in two distinct respects. First, two dimensions of car use
are considered: the discrete decision to own a car and the continuous decision of di-
stance traveled. Because these decisions are related and, moreover, may be inﬂuenced
by factors unobservable to the researcher, we explore alternative speciﬁcations using
censored regression techniques to assess whether the results are subject to biases emer-
ging from sample selectivity. Second, expanding on the single-car focus of FRONDEL,
PETERS, and VANCE (2008), the data set analyzed here includes multiple-car-owning
households, thereby allowing us to explore the sensitivity of the estimates to their in-
clusion.
Our results, which range between 35% and 52%, indicate rebound and price ef-
fects that are substantially larger than the typical effects obtained from U.S. based stu-
dies, but that are lower than the 57% to 67% range identiﬁed by FRONDEL,P ETERS, and
VANCE (2008). Given the magnitude of the estimates, we conclude that our ﬁndings
call into question the efﬁcacy of policies targeted at reducing energy consumption via
technological efﬁciency. Instead, these results suggest raising prices via fuel taxes to be
a promising energy conservation and climate protection measure.
The following section describes the data base used in the estimation. Section 3
presents the deﬁnitions of the key variables and draws on BECKER’s household pro-
duction framework to prove the direct rebound effect. Section 4 describes the econo-
5metric models speciﬁed for estimating both mobility behavior as well as the rebound
effect, followed by the presentation and interpretation of the results in Section 5. The
last section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Data
The data employed in this research are drawn from the German Mobility Panel (MOP
2007), an ongoing publicly available travel survey1. We use ten years of data from the
survey, spanning 1997 through 2006, a period during which real fuel prices in Germany
rose 3% per annum. Households that participate in the survey are requested to ﬁll out
a questionnaire eliciting general socioeconomic information, such as residential loca-
tion, as well as person-related characteristics, including gender, age, and employment
status.
Our focus in the present analysis is on a subset of this data, referred to as the tank
survey, which covers vehicle travel among randomly selected car-owning households
from the larger sample. This survey takes place over a roughly six-week period in
each of three consecutive years, during which time respondents record the price paid
for fuel with each visit to the gas station, the distance traveled, and vehicle attributes
such as fuel economy and fuel type for each car driven during the survey. The unit
of observation in this data is the car, so that households owning multiple cars occupy
several rows of data. As the models estimated in this analysis draw on panel methods
in which the cross-sectional unit is deﬁned as the household, the inclusion of such
multi-car households preclude the unique identiﬁcation of an observation based on
the interaction of the panel- and time variables. Consequently, we randomly select one
of these cars for inclusion in the ﬁnal data set, though we also explore the robustness
of the results when the multi-car households are omitted from the sample.
The data is augmented by merging in socioeconomic characteristics from the ge-
neral survey, which is also carried out over three years for each household. As the tank
1Contact information on obtaining the data is available at http://www.dlr.de/cs/de/.
6survey includes only car-owning households, we additionally append randomly selec-
ted no-car households from the general survey, such that they comprise roughly 20%
of the observations in a given year.2 The resulting data set contains 940 car-owning
households. Of these, 402 participated in two years of the survey and 538 in all three
years, yielding a total of 2,418 observations.3
In addition to fuel prices and fuel economy, several other automobile attributes
and household characteristics are speciﬁed as control variables in the analysis, the de-
scriptive statistics for which are presented in Table 1. To capture the effects of automo-
bile quality, the age of the car and two dummy variables indicating luxury and diesel
models are included. Demographic inﬂuences are measured by the number of adults,
the percentage of those who are female, and the number of children under 18 years of
age. Wealth effects are captured by a dummy indicating multiple car ownership, the
number of employed residents, the number with a college preparatory degree, and a
categorical variable measuring household income.4
To control for events that may disrupt the normal pattern of travel, dummies
are included indicating whether any employed member changed jobs in the preceding
year and whether the household undertook a vacation with the car during the survey
period. Finally, to capture ﬁxed costs incurred with owning a car but not with driving,
we include an insurance cost index compiled by the German Insurance Association.
Thisindextakesanintegervaluebetween1and12andmeasurestheaverageinsurance
cost of car ownership at the provincial level. Because the approximately 445 provinces
in the data set are delineated at a slightly higher level of spatial aggregation than the
2Roughly 80% of cars in Germany own at least one car (MiD 2008).
3To assess the possibility of attrition bias, we also explored speciﬁcations of the Two-Part Model
that included a dummy variable indicating the two-year participating households. As the dummy was
insigniﬁcant and had a negligible impact on the remaining coefﬁcients, it was left out of the ﬁnal speci-
ﬁcations.
4As is typical for survey data, information on income is missing for a large share of the households.
To impute the missing values, we employ the expectation-maximization algorithm recommended by
King et al. (2001). The employed algorithm can be implemented using a program compatible with the
statistical software R, and is downloadable from http://gking.harvard.edu.
7Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev.
s Monthly kilometers driven 1185.90 771.79
e Monthly fuel consumption in liters 96.21 64.13
µ Kilometers driven per liter 12.68 2.88
ps Real fuel price in e per kilometer 0.08 0.02
pe Real fuel price in e per liter 0.97 0.14
car age Age of the car 6.23 4.34
premium car Dummy: 1 if car is a sports- or luxury model 0.22 0.41
diesel car Dummy: 1 if car uses diesel 0.13 0.34
car vacation Dummy: 1 if household undertook
car vacation during the survey period 0.22 0.42
multiple car Dummy: 1 if Household has more than 1 car 0.28 0.45
# employed Number of employed household members 0.98 0.84
# college preparatory degree Number of household members with
a college preparatory degree 0.60 0.76
income Household income class (1-8) 5.06 1.38
new job Dummy: 1 if person changed the job last year 0.12 0.32
# adults Number of adult household members 1.82 0.70
% female Share of female household members 0.51 0.30
# children Number of children younger than 17 0.47 0.84
city Dummy: 1 if household resides in a city 0.43 0.49
insurance cost Car insurance cost class (1-12) 6.12 2.49
8zip code delineation of the MOP data, a Geographic Information System was used to
merge in the insurance cost variable.
3 Key Deﬁnitions and the Rebound Effect
In this section, we present the deﬁnitions of the key variables of our analysis, the pri-
ce of mobility services and energy efﬁciency, and provide a theoretical derivation of
the direct5 rebound effect that is due to efﬁciency improvements. The deﬁnition of
energy efﬁciency typically employed in the economic literature, see e. g. BINSWANGER





where the efﬁciency parameter µi characterizes the technology with which an amount
si of service i is provided and ei denotes the energy input employed for a service such
asmobility.Forthespeciﬁcexampleofindividualconveyance,parameterµi designates
fuel efﬁciency, which can be measured in terms of vehicle kilometers per liter of fuel
input.
Efﬁciency deﬁnition (1) reﬂects the fact that the higher the efﬁciency µi of a given
technology, the less energy ei = si/µi is required for the provision of service i and,
hence, the lower is the amount of greenhouse gases that are emitted if fossil fuels are
used. Hence, the concept of energy efﬁciency is perfectly in line with BECKER’s (1965)
seminal work on household production, according to which households are, ultimate-
ly, not interested in the amount of energy required for a certain amount of service, but
in the energy service itself:
si = fi(ei,t i,k i,o i), (2)
where production function fi describes how households “produce” service i in the
5The literature distinguishes between direct and indirect rebound effects (e. g. GREENINGand GREE-
NE 1997, GREENE et al. 1999). The latter arises from an income effect: lower per-unit cost of an energy
service implies - ceteris paribus - that real income grows. Given that indirect effects are difﬁcult to quan-
tify, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies are conﬁned to analyzing the direct rebound effect.
9amount of si by using time, ti, capital, ki, other market goods oi, and energy, ei. Based
on efﬁciency deﬁnition (1), it follows that the price psi per unit of the energy service,












Along the lines of BECKER (1965), it is assumed that any households’s utility de-
pends solely on the amounts s1,...,sn of services:







< 0 for i =1 ,...,n. (4)
The household’s available time budget T is split up into the hours tw spent on working
and the time necessary to produce services:








peei + pkki + pooi, (6)
if the non-wage income is zero. pe and po indicate the prices of energy and other market
good inputs, respectively, while pk captures the annualized investment cost required
for service i.
The Lagrangian L for the utility maximization problem subject to budget cons-
traint (6) and time restriction (5) reads
L := u(s1,s 2,...,sn) − λ
 n 
i=1
(peei + pkki + pooi + wti) − wT

. (7)
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10where we have employed price relationship (3), i. e. psi = pe/µi, and ∂ej/∂sj =1 /µj,
thereby exploiting efﬁciency deﬁnition (1).
Using this framework, the direct rebound effect, describing the increase in service
demand due to the improvement in the efﬁciency of providing service j, can be proved
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Proof: The ﬁrst-order condition (9) can be solved for sj, since ∂u
∂sj is invertible due to
∂2u
∂s2
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j < 0 and λ>0, which results from ∂u
∂sj > 0 and ﬁrst-order condition (8). The
positivity of ηµj(sj) then holds due to
∂sj
∂µj > 0. This theoretical hypothesis is intuitive:
Households will usually demand more of a service when it becomes cheaper due to an
efﬁciency improvement.
4 Methodology
The reliance on household-level panel data to test this hypothesis raises several con-
ceptual and empirical issues, the most fundamental of which is the presence of null
11values in the data. As 20% of the households do not own a car, the observation on di-
stance driven is consequently recorded as zero. To accommodate this feature of the da-
ta, we employ two censored regression procedures – the Two-Part and Heckit models
– that order observations into two regimes deﬁned by whether the household owns a
car.
4.1 The Models
The ﬁrst stage of both procedures, referred to as the selector equation, deﬁnes a dicho-
tomous variable indicating the regime into which the observation falls:
S =1 ,if S
∗ = X1τ + ε1 > 0 and S =0 ,if S
∗ ≤ 0 (10)
where S∗ is a latent variable indicating the utility from car ownership, S is an indicator
for car ownership status, matrix X1 includes the determinants of this status, τ is a
vector of associated parameter estimates, and ε1 is an error term assumed to have a
standard normal distribution.
In addition to estimating τ using the probit maximum likelihood method, the
second stage of the models, referred to as the outcome equation, involves estimating
the parameters β via an OLS regression conditional on care use, S =1 :
E[y|S =1 ,X2]=X2β + E(ε2|y>0,X2), (11)
where y is the dependent variable, measured here either as the kilometers of vehicle
travel or fuel consumption over the six week survey, X2 includes the determinants of
y, and ε2 is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed.
The key distinction between the Two-Part Model (2PM) and HECKMAN’s two-
stage sample selection model, frequently called the Heckit model, is the inclusion of
an additional regressor - the inverse Mill’s ratio (IVM) - in the second stage regression
to control for potential selectivity bias (HECKMAN 1979). In omitting this regressor, the
2PM imposes the assumption that E(ε2|y>0,X2)=0 . The relative merits of this sim-
pliﬁcation has been the subject of a vigorous debate in the literature (HAY and OLSON,
121984; DUAN et al. 1984; LUENG and YU 1996; DOW and NORTON, 2003), with much of
the discussion focusing on their underlying assumptions and numerical properties.
Although we explore the use of both models, two considerations led us to select
the 2PM as the superior alternative for this analysis. First, the estimated coefﬁcient on
the IVM, presented in the Appendix, is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that sample selectivi-
ty may not be an issue with these data. Second, as discussed by DOW and NORTON
(2003), a more substantive consideration in choosing between the two models is whe-
ther interest centers on the actual or potential outcome of the phenomena under study.
In the present context, the potential outcome y∗ addresses the distance a hou-
sehold would drive were it to own a car, irrespective of actual ownership, while the
actual outcome y addresses the observed distance driven, equaling zero if no car is
owned (y =0 ). Whereas the actual outcome y is a fully-observed variable, the potenti-
al outcome y∗ is a latent variable that is only partially observed, namely for those who
have chosen to own a car: y∗ = y if y>0, but y∗ is unidentiﬁed if y =0 , i. e. for tho-
se who have refrained from car ownership. While the Heckit estimator was designed
to address selection bias for analyzing potential outcomes, it incorporates features that
make it often perform worse than the 2PM when analyzing actual outcomes (DOWand
NORTON2003:6). Accordingly, the 2PM is deemed here the more appropriate modeling
speciﬁcation to estimate the effect of fuel prices and socioeconomic traits on actual di-
stance driven or actual fuel consumption, whereas estimating the impact on potential
distances or consumption does not conceptually ﬁt to the goal of our study.
4.2 Calculation of Elasticities
For estimating the marginal effects of socioeconomic determinants on actual distances
or actual fuel consumption, it is necessary to take account of the likelihood that a hou-
sehold refrains from owning a car, P(y =0 ) . Hence, the prediction of the dependent
variable consists of two parts, with the ﬁrst part being the probability of owning the car,
P(y>0) = Φ(X1τ), which results from the ﬁrst stage (10) of the 2PM, and the second
13part being the conditional expectation E[y|y>0] = X2β from the second stage (11):
E[y]=P(y>0) · E[y|y>0] + P(y =0 )· E[y|y =0 ]
= P(y>0) · E[y|y>0 ]+0=Φ ( X1τ) · X2β. (12)
As our interest centers on elasticities, we now present the required formulae for
the corresponding 2PM with a logged dependent variable z = ln(y) and normal ho-
moskedastic errors ε2 with constant variance Var(ε2)=σ2, following DOW and NOR-
TON (2003:11). Rather than by (12), actual outcomes are in this case predicted by6 :
E[y]=Φ ( X1τ) · exp{X2β +0 .5 · σ
2}. (13)
Using the product and chain rules of differentiation and the fact that the derivative of
the cumulative normal function Φ equals the normal density function φ, the marginal
effect can be derived as follows:
∂E[y]
∂xk
= βk · E[y]+τk · φ(X1τ) · exp{X2β + .5 · σ
2}




By dividing expression (14) by E(y), the elasticity formula for logged explanatory va-

























· xj =[ βj + τj ·
φ(X1τ)
Φ(X1τ)
] · xj (16)
To handle the case of dummy variables Dk, we employ the following relative diffe-
rences, thereby using the formula of the expected value (13):
(E[y|Dk =1 ]− E[y|Dk =0 ] ) /E[y]. (17)
6If z = ln(y) has a normal distribution with an expected value of E(z)=µ and variance σ2, then y
has a lognormal distribution and an expected value of E(y)=e x p {µ +0 .5 · σ2}.
144.3 Model Speciﬁcations
The model speciﬁcations presented here are based on the logged version (13) of the
2PM and are intimately connected with the deﬁnitions of the rebound effect cata-
logued by FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008:148, 149). Referring to their Deﬁni-
tion 1, i. e. the elasticity of service demand with respect to efﬁciency, ηµ(s)= ∂ lns
∂ lnµ, the
dependent variable of our Model 1 is the log of kilometers traveled, ln(s):
E[ln(s)] = Φ(X1τ) · exp{βpe ln(pe)+βµ ln(µ)+X2β +0 .5 · σ
2}. (18)
where the set of explanatory variables speciﬁcally includes the logged price of fuel per
liter, ln(pe), as well as the log of kilometers traveled per liter, ln(µ).
A particular feature of Model 1 bears noting: It is to be expected that the elasticity
of service demand with respect to efﬁciency estimated from this model is of the same
order as the elasticity of service demand with respect to fuel prices:
H0 : ηµ(s)=−ηpe(s). (19)
This null hypothesis is intuitive: for constant fuel prices pe, raising the energy efﬁciency
µ should have the same effect on service demand, i. e. the distance traveled, as falling
fuel prices pe given a constant energy efﬁciency µ. It is precisely the validity of H0
that gives rise to the assumption that both price and rebound effects, identiﬁed here
by ηµ(s), are just responses of the same order to changes in the unit costs of energy
services, yet going into opposite directions.
Since Deﬁnition 2 of the rebound effect is based on the negative own-price elasti-
city of service demand, ηps(s), the dependent variable of the corresponding Model 2
is the same as in Model 1, but rather than the logged price of fuel per liter, the set of
explanatory variables includes the logged price of service demand, ln(ps):
E[ln(s)] = Φ(X1τ) · exp{βps ln(ps)+X2β +0 .5 · σ
2}, (20)
Recognizing that ps =
pe
µ , and that ln(ps) = ln(pe) − ln(µ), it can be seen that this
speciﬁcation is functionally equivalent to Model 1 if hypothesis (19) holds. In this case,
it is βpe = −βµ.
15Referring to Deﬁnition 3 of the rebound effect, which is based on the negative
own-price elasticity of energy consumption, ηpe(e), the dependent variable of the cor-
responding Model 3 is the logged liters of fuel consumed:
E[ln(e)] = Φ(X1τ) · exp{βpe ln(pe)+X2β +0 .5 · σ
2}, (21)
where the set of explanatory variables speciﬁcally includes the logged price of fuel
per liter, ln(pe). The remaining suite of variables included in these models measure the
individual, household, and automobile attributes that are hypothesized to inﬂuence
the extent of motorized travel.
Finally, it bears noting that it is possible to examine whether Model 3 differs from
Model 2 by testing the hypothesis
H0 : βpe = −1 (22)
on the basis of the estimates of Model 3 and, additionally, by testing the hypothesis
H0 : βps = −1 (23)
on the basis of the estimates of Model 2. Only if both hypotheses were to hold would
Model 2 be identical to Model 3 (see FRONDEL,P ETERS, and VANCE (2008:151)).
To exploit the panel dimension of the data, we employ the ﬁxed-effects estimator
in the analysis of distance traveled. The random-effects estimator was also explored,
but, while many of the coefﬁcients were similar to the ﬁxed effects, this model was
rejected by a standard HAUSMAN test. A key virtue of the ﬁxed-effects model is to
control for the inﬂuence of time-invariant unobservable variables that could otherwise
bias the estimated coefﬁcients. This is a particularly useful feature in the present ap-
plication given that the measures of fuel efﬁciency used in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 of the
rebound effect may be vulnerable to endogeneity bias.7
Households that drive longer distances because they live in rural areas, for ex-
ample, may select more efﬁcient cars, thereby leading to an inﬂated estimate of the
7This source of bias does not afﬂict the estimates corresponding to Deﬁnition 3, as Model 3 does not
include fuel efﬁciency.
16rebound effect. To the extent that the unobserved characteristics that affect both fuel
economy and vehicle mileage remain constant over time, the ﬁxed effects model will
control for this source of bias. Although it is not possible to exclude the possibility of
relevant time-variant unobservables, we believe that the range of explanatory varia-
bles – including the number of children, the number of employed, and job changes –
provides reasonably good coverage of temporal changes whose absence could induce
biases.
5 Empirical Results
Table 2 presents elasticity estimates corresponding to each of the three deﬁnitions of
the rebound effect, conditional on car ownership. To focus on the salient results, we
refrain here from reporting the coefﬁcients of the ﬁrst-stage Probit models and instead
present these in the appendix. It bears noting, however, that the Probit results are re-
ﬂected in both the estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors presented in Table 2 via
the application of Equations (15) - (17). Because these equations comprise multiple pa-
rameters that make analytical computation of the variance impossible, we apply the
Delta method to calculate statistical signiﬁcance. This approach uses a ﬁrst-order Tay-
lor expansion to create a linear approximation of a non-linear function, after which the
variance and measures of statistical signiﬁcance can be computed.
Turning ﬁrst to the coefﬁcients on ln(µ), ln(pe), ln(ps), the estimated rebound ef-
fects are all seen to be highly signiﬁcant, ranging from 0.35 in Model 3 to 0.52 in Model
1. Although these estimates are somewhat lower than those of FRONDEL,P ETERS, and
VANCE (2008), they are nevertheless substantial, and suggest that between 35% and
52% of the potential energy savings due to an efﬁciency improvement is lost to increa-
sed driving.
17Table 2: Estimation Results of the Two-Part-Model.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable ln(s)l n ( s)l n ( e)
Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors
ln(µ) ∗∗ 0.515 (0.090) – – – –
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.406 (0.134) – – ∗∗ -0.348 (0.134)
ln(ps) –– ∗∗-0.490 (0.073) – –
car age ∗∗-0.027 (0.005) ∗∗-0.027 (0.005) ∗∗ -0.026 (0.005)
diesel car 0.164 (0.097) 0.151 (0.095) 0.085 (0.052)
premium car ∗∗ 0.360 (0.073) ∗∗ 0.354 (0.072) ∗∗ 0.451 (0.043)
multiple car ∗∗ -0.187 (0.059) ∗∗-0.186 (0.059) ∗∗ -0.190 (0.038)
vacation with car ∗∗ 0.291 (0.033) ∗∗ 0.292 (0.033) ∗∗ 0.284 (0.023)
# adults ∗ 0.197 (0.088) ∗0.200 (0.085) ∗0.205 (0.089)
% females -0.024 (0.050) -0.023 (0.049) -0.026 (0.051)
# children -0.022 (0.021) -0.022 (0.021) -0.015 (0.020)
# college preparatory degree ∗-0.050 (0.025) ∗ -0.050 (0.024) -0.045 (0.025)
# employed -0.007 (0.034) -0.008 (0.034) 0.003 (0.033)
new job 0.021 (0.019) 0.021 (0.018) 0.019 (0.018)
income ∗∗ 0.455 (0.071) ∗∗ 0.456 (0.061) ∗∗ 0.434 (0.061)
H0 : βpe = −1 F(1, 2.403) = ∗∗ 23.47
H0 : βps = −1 F(1, 2.403) = ∗∗ 48.13
H0 : βµ = −βpe F(1, 2.403) = 0.81
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. Number of observations used
for estimation: 2,418.
Focusing speciﬁcally on the estimates from Model 1, we can additionally test
whether the impact of efﬁciency improvements on traveled distance is of the same
order as the effect of fuel prices: As reported in the ultimate row of the table, we can-
not reject this hypothesis, which translates into H0 : βµ = −βpe. Hence, there is no
reason, neither on a theoretical nor an empirical basis, to assume that the estimates
corresponding to Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 of the rebound effect as well as Models 1 and
182 are principally different, a conclusion that is validated by the close estimates of the
whole range of regressors. Despite this closeness, Model 3 is not identical to Models 1
or 2, as is conﬁrmed by the rejection of the null hypotheses that the price coefﬁcients
in Models 3 and 2 are both -1.
With respect to the remaining control variables, most have either intuitive effects
or are statistically insigniﬁcant. Referencing the estimates from Model 1, older cars are
seen to be driven less while premium cars are driven more. Another important de-
terminant is whether a vacation with the car was undertaken over the survey period,
which results in a roughly 34% (=exp(0.29)-1) increase in distance traveled. Among the
signiﬁcant sociodemographic variables, the number of adults and household income
both have positive effects, whereas the dummy indicating a multi-car household has a
negative effect, a likely reﬂection of the household’s ability to use cars other than the
one under observation. With respect to income, it bears noting that the (unreported)
unadjusted coefﬁcient estimate that takes no account of the probability of a positive
outcome of carownership is insigniﬁcant. That thisdistinction can result in qualitative-
ly different conclusions suggests the importance of correctly dealing with a censored
dependent variable when calculating elasticities.
To further explore the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the multi-car
households, we removed them from the data and re-estimated the model. As can be
gleaned from the results presented in Table 3, this omission has little bearing on the
conclusions drawn from the analysis. The most notable change is that the fuel-price
elasticity estimates become smaller in magnitude when multi-car households are in-
cluded in the sample. While the difference between the estimates is statistically minor
andshouldnotbeover-interpreted,onepossibleexplanationisthatahighersensitivity
to fuel prices prevails among households that cannot substitute between cars.
We thus conclude that our estimates, be they based on Deﬁnition 1, 2, or 3 of the
rebound effect, are substantially larger than the typical effects obtained from the U.S.
transport sector. Using household survey data, GREENE,K AHN, and GIBSON(1999:1),
for instance, ﬁnd a long-run “take back” of about 20% of potential energy savings, con-
19Table 3: Comparison of Rebound Effects with and without Multi-Car Households.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable ln(s)l n ( s)l n ( e)
Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors
Without Multi-Car Households, Number of observations: 1,732
ln(µ) ∗ 0.518 (0.107) – – – –
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.528 (0.136) – – ∗∗ -0.486 (0.135)
ln(ps) –– ∗∗-0.521 (0.084) – –
With Multi-Car Households, Number of observations: 2,418
ln(µ) ∗∗ 0.515 (0.090) – – – –
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.406 (0.134) – – ∗∗ -0.348 (0.107)
ln(ps) –– ∗∗-0.490 (0.073) – –
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
ﬁrming the results of other U. S. studies using national and or state-level data. While
thisissuehasreceivedrelativelylessscrutinyintheEuropeancontext,ourresultsfallat
the upper-end of those of WALKER and WIRL (1993), who estimate a long-run rebound
effect of 36% for Germany using aggregate time-series data.
6 Summary and Conclusion
While energy policy in Europe has traditionally relied heavily on fuel taxation, it is
currently undergoing a process of bifurcation, with an increasing reliance on fuel-
efﬁciencystandardstoreduceemissions.Thisshiftisevidencedbythevoluntaryagree-
ment negotiated in 1998 between the EC and the European Automobile Manufacturers
Association stipulating the reduction of average emissions to 140g CO2/km by 2008, in
addition to subsequent legislation that would set additional targets for 2012. Although
such standards undoubtedly confer economic beneﬁts in their own right, their associa-
ted implications for emissions depends fundamentally on the behavioral response to
20cheaper per-unit energy prices. To the extent that motorists drive more when costs of
driving are reduced, we would expect policies based on fuel taxation and those based
on fuel efﬁciency standards to have opposing effects on vehicle kilometers traveled, a
seeming incongruity that has largely escaped the notice of policy-makers.
The analysis pursued in this paper has attempted to inform the policy discus-
sion on this issue by estimating the magnitude of both fuel-price and fuel-efﬁciency
elasticities, using panel household data from Germany. Our most conservative esti-
mate of fuel-price elasticities amounts to -0.35, indicating that fuel taxation may have
a substantial impact in lowering fuel consumption and, hence, greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Of a similar magnitude, but opposite sign is our conservative estimate of the
fuel-efﬁciency elasticity of +0.52, suggesting a sizeable leakage in the potential emissi-
ons reductionsfrom efﬁciencyimprovements commonly calledrebound effect.Equally
noteworthy, we conﬁrm the hypothesis that fuel-efﬁciency and price effects are simply
two sides of the same coin: behavioral changes due to varied unit cost of energy ser-
vices. In fact, the order of the effect of a change in the fuel price on driving turns out
to be statistically non-distinguishable from the impact of a change in fuel economy, a
circumstance that serves to highlight the inverse relationship between the effectiveness
of fuel taxes in reducing driving and the effect of efﬁciency standards in increasing it.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the current emphasis in Europe on
efﬁciency as a principle means to address environmental challenges (e.g. EC 2007) may
be misplaced. While such an emphasis has been a mainstay of energy policy in the
U.S. ever since the creation of the so-called CAFE standards in 1975, the fuel efﬁciency
of the passenger car ﬂeet in the U.S. has long lagged behind that of Europe. Given
the divergent trajectories of automotive technologies on the European and American
markets, the different respective policy emphases with respect to fuel tax taxation, and
the evidence presented in this paper that driving costs and, hence, oil prices matter for
driving behavior, we conclude that the logic of introducing fuel efﬁciency standards to
reduce emissions is dubious.
21Appendix: Probit Estimation Results
Table A1: Probit Estimation Results for Car Ownership
Coeff.s Errors Elast.s Errors
# adults ∗∗ .576 (.068) ∗∗ .091 (.011)
% female ∗∗ -.448 (.082) ∗∗ -.071 (.014)
# children .028 (.063) .005 (.010)
# college preparatory degree ∗ -.144 (.060) ∗-.023 (.010)
# employed .100 (.061) .016 (.009)
new job .005 (.119) .001 (.019)
income ∗∗ .594 (.035) ∗∗ .094 (.006)
city ∗∗ -.308 (.074) ∗∗ -.050 (.013)
insurance cost ∗∗ -.056 (.012) ∗∗ -.009 (.002)
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level,
respectively. Number of observations used for estimation: 3,022.
ThekeydistinctionbetweentheTwo-PartandHeckitmodelistheinclusionofthe
inverse Mill’s ratio (IVM) in the second stage to control for potential selectivity bias.
To effectively identify the Heckit model requires the inclusion of at least one variable
that uniquely determines the discrete choice of car ownership but not the continuous
choice of distance traveled. In the present example, this selection can be informed by
consideration of the ﬁxed costs incurred with owning a car but not with driving. As
an identifying variable, we include the cost insurance index compiled by the German
Insurance Association. Consistent with expectations, Table A1 shows that this variable
has a negative effect on the probability of car ownership, as increases in the index mea-
sure higher insurance costs. Table A2 indicates, however, that the estimated coefﬁcient
on the IVM is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that sample selectivity may not be an issue with
these data. The remaining results in Table A2 are of approximately the same magnitude
as those in Table 2.
22Table A2: Estimation Results of the Heckit-Model.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable ln(s)l n ( s)l n ( e)
Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors Elast.s Std. Errors
ln(µ) ∗∗ 0.515 (0.090) – – – –
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.410 (0.135) – – ∗∗ -0.470 (0.138)
ln(ps) –– ∗∗ -0.491 (0.048) – –
car age ∗∗-0.027 (0.005) ∗∗ -0.027 (0.003) ∗∗ -0.029 (0.005)
diesel car 0.163 (0.010) 0.150 (0.050) ∗ 0.248 (0.097)
premium car ∗∗ 0.361 (0.073) ∗∗ 0.355 (0.043) ∗∗ 0.263 (0.075)
multiple car ∗∗ -0.189 (0.060) ∗∗ -0.188 (0.037) ∗∗ -0.186 (0.059)
vacation with car ∗∗ 0.291 (0.033) ∗∗ 0.291 (0.022) ∗∗ 0.299 (0.034)
# adults ∗∗ 0.278 (0.100) ∗∗ 0.281 (0.096) ∗∗ 0.271 (0.097)
% females -0.046 (0.051) -0.045 (0.051) -0.044 (0.051)
# children ∗-0.020 (0.022) -0.020 (0.022) -0.026 (0.023)
# college preparatory degree ∗-0.057 (0.026) ∗ -0.057 (0.026) ∗ -0.062 (0.027)
# employed 0.001 (0.036) -0.001 (0.036) -0.010 (0.037)
new job 0.021 (0.020) 0.021 (0.019) 0.022 (0.019)
income ∗∗ 0.716 (0.137) ∗∗ 0.720 (0.137) ∗∗ 0.740 (0.140)
inverse Mill’s ratio 0.066 (0.106) 0.069 (0.082) ∗∗ 0.068 (0.110)
Note: ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. Number of observations
used for estimation: 2,418.
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